Nuclear Deterrence Theory: The Search for Credibility by Robert Powell (English)

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Applying recent advances in game theory to the study of nuclear deterrence, the author examines some of the most complex and problematic issues in deterrence theory. Game-theoretic analysis allows the author to model the effects on deterrence strategies of first-strike advantages, of limited retaliation, and of the number of nuclear superpowers involved in the international system. With the formalizations he develops, the author is able to demonstrate the fundamental similarity of the two seemingly disparate deterrence strategies that have evolved in response to the superpower arms buildup; the strategy that leaves something to chance and the strategy of limited retaliation.

FORMATPaperback LANGUAGEEnglish CONDITIONBrand New Publisher Description

Applying advances in game theory to the study of nuclear deterrence, Robert Powell examines the foundations of deterrence theory. Game-theoretic analysis allows the author to explore some of the most complex and problematic issues in deterrence theory, including the effects of first-strike advantages, limited retaliation, and the number of nuclear powers in the international system on the dynamics of escalation. With the formalizations he develops, the author is able to demonstrate the fundamental similarity of the two seemingly disparate deterrrent strategies that have evolved in response to the nuclear revolution and the condition of mutually assured destruction: the strategy of limited retaliation. The author argues that the logic underlying both strategies centres on a search for ways to make the use of force or the threat of its use credible when any use of force might escalate to mutual devastation.

Author Biography

Robert Powell, the leading architectural writer on Asia, is an architect and urban designer currently in private practice in the United Kingdom. He is the author of 27 books on architecture and urban design, including the seminal works "The Asian House" and "TheTropical Asian House."

Table of Contents

Preface; 1. Introduction; 2. The nuclear revolution and the problem of credibility; 3. The dynamics of nuclear brinkmanship; 4. Stability and longer brinkmanship crises; 5. Crisis stability in the nuclear age; 6. Stability and the lack of control; 7. The strategy of limited retaliation; 8. An appraisal; Appendix: some introductory notes on game theory; References; Index.

Review

"...the most serious and most productive application of the formal game theory to the study of deterrence and the outbreak of war...this is the first book-length treatment I have seen that makes successful use of game theory in exploring the most elusive aspects of this subject." Thomas Schelling, author of The Strategy of Conflict

Review Quote

"...the most serious and most productive application of the formal game theory to the study of deterrence and the outbreak of war...this is the first book-length treatment I have seen that makes successful use of game theory in exploring the most elusive aspects of this subject." Thomas Schelling, author of The Strategy of Conflict

Promotional "Headline"

Applying advances in game theory to the study of nuclear deterrence, Robert Powell examines the foundations of deterrence theory.

Description for Bookstore

Applying advances in game theory to the study of nuclear deterrence, Robert Powell examines the foundations of deterrence theory. Game-theoretic analysis allows the author to explore some of the most complex and problematic issues in deterrence theory, including the effects of first-strike advantages, limited retaliation, and the number of nuclear powers in the international system on the dynamics of escalation.

Description for Library

Applying advances in game theory to the study of nuclear deterrence, Robert Powell examines the foundations of deterrence theory. Game-theoretic analysis allows the author to explore some of the most complex and problematic issues in deterrence theory, including the effects of first-strike advantages, limited retaliation, and the number of nuclear powers in the international system on the dynamics of escalation.

Details ISBN052106399X Author Robert Powell Short Title NUCLEAR DETERRENCE THEORY Pages 240 Publisher Cambridge University Press Language English ISBN-10 052106399X ISBN-13 9780521063999 Media Book Format Paperback DEWEY 355.021 Year 2008 Publication Date 2008-02-28 Imprint Cambridge University Press Subtitle The Search for Credibility Place of Publication Cambridge Country of Publication United Kingdom Edition 1st Illustrations Yes DOI 10.1604/9780521063999 Audience Professional and Scholarly UK Release Date 2008-06-05 AU Release Date 2008-06-05 NZ Release Date 2008-06-05 We've got this

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