The Nile on eBay FREE SHIPPING UK WIDE Perfect Deterrence by Frank C. Zagare, D. Marc Kilgour
This book provides the first general analysis of deterrence since the end of the Cold War, offering a new approach to its assumptions, and analyzing them using non-cooperative game theory. Drawing on numerous historical examples, the authors focus on the relationship among capability, preferences, credibility, and outcomes to achieve a new understanding of threats and responses. The book's distinctive approach yields some surprising conclusions, indicating that credible threats to respond to attack can sometimes make an attack more likely, and that incredible response threats can sometimes promote peace.
FORMATPaperback LANGUAGEEnglish CONDITIONBrand New Publisher Description
An important and timely contribution to International Relations and political science, this is the first general analysis of deterrence since the end of the Cold War. Using non-cooperative game theory, the authors develop a new approach to deterrence (Perfect Deterrence Theory), which they apply to unilateral and mutual direct-deterrence relationships, and to extended-deterrence relationships supported by deployment policies such as Massive Retaliation and Flexible Response. The authors focus on the relationship among capabilities, preferences, credibility, and outcomes to achieve a new understanding of threats and responses. Some surprising conclusions emerge, indicating that credible threats to respond to attack can sometimes make an attack more likely, and that incredible response threats can sometimes promote peace. With the application of deterrence theory in diverse social settings, and historical examples from before, during, and after the Cold War, this book provides a welcome new examination of the subject.
Author Biography
Frank C. Zagare is assistant professor of political science at Boston University and is the author of "Game Theory: Concepts & Applications,"
Table of Contents
Part I. Theoretical Underpinnings: 1. Classical deterrence theory; 2. Rationality and deterrence; 3. Credibility: the magic ingredient of deterrence; Part II. Direct Deterrence: 4. Uncertainty and mutual deterrence; 5. Unilateral deterrence; Part III. Extended Deterrence: 6. Extended deterrence; 7. Modeling massive retaliation; 8. Modeling flexible response; 9. Crisis, escalation, and limited war; Part IV. Implications: 10. Perfect deterrence theory.
Review
'The theory of deterrence formed the foundation of American grand strategy during the decades of the Cold War. It is a deeply flawed theory both in terms of logical rigor and consistency with the historical record. Frank C. Zagare and Marc Kilgour convincingly demonstrate the weaknesses of classical deterrence theory and then proceed to develop a new, elegant, game theoretic treatment of all forms of deterrence. Perfect Deterrence Theory explains both why and when credible threats matter. It offers a comprehensive view of deterrence that is neither limited to nuclear weapons nor to conventional weapons, but spans all deterrent circumstances. The authors write in such a lucid style and the modeling is so accessible that this book is bound to influence scholarship and foreign policy strategizing for years to come. Perfect Deterrence is a superb examination of one of the most important foreign policy problems of our time.' Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Hoover Institution for War and Peace, Stanford University 'Perfect Deterrence is the most insightful and comprehensive book on modern deterrence theory ever written. It is also amazingly accessible. I can't imagine teaching a graduate or advanced undergraduate course in either international relations or security without it.' George Downs, New York University
Review Quote
"...Zagare and Kilgour are to be commended...They present complex results clearly...Notation is clear and consistent, making it easy to directly compare equilibrium conditions for different models. Throughout the book, each set of findings is illustrated with appropriate examples, drawing from a wide array of historical eras." American Political Science Review
Promotional "Headline"
The first general analysis of deterrence since the Cold War, using game theory and containing numerous historical examples.
Description for Bookstore
This book provides the first general analysis of deterrence since the end of the Cold War, offering a new approach to its assumptions, and analyzing them using game theory. Drawing on numerous historical examples, the authors' analysis provides a new understanding of threats and responses, and yields some surprising conclusions.
Description for Library
This book provides the first general analysis of deterrence since the end of the Cold War, offering a new approach to its assumptions, and analyzing them using game theory. Drawing on numerous historical examples, the authors' analysis provides a new understanding of threats and responses, and yields some surprising conclusions.
Details ISBN0521787130 Author D. Marc Kilgour Short Title PERFECT DETERRENCE Publisher Cambridge University Press Series Cambridge Studies in International Relations (Paperback) Language English ISBN-10 0521787130 ISBN-13 9780521787130 Media Book Format Paperback DEWEY 355.021 Series Number 72 Illustrations Yes Year 2000 Publication Date 2000-09-30 Imprint Cambridge University Press Place of Publication Cambridge Country of Publication United Kingdom Pages 442 Affiliation Wilfrid Laurier University, Ontario DOI 10.1604/9780521787130 Audience Professional and Scholarly UK Release Date 2000-09-21 AU Release Date 2000-09-21 NZ Release Date 2000-09-21 We've got this
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